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Abstract
The paper examines a question of how much more resources do organized business
interests have when compared to resources of civil society groups in the context
of privacy lobbying in the European Union (EU). To answer to the question, the
paper draws from classical literature on power resources and pluralism. The empirical
material comes from a lobbying register maintained by the EU. According to the
results, (a) there is only a small difference in terms of the average financial
and human resources, but a vast difference when absolute amounts are used.
Furthermore, (b) organized business interests are better affiliated with each other
and other organizations. Finally, (c) many organized business interests maintain their
offices in the United States, whereas the non-governmental organizations observed
are mostly European. With these results and the accompanying discussion, the paper
contributes to the underresearched but inflammatory topic of privacy politics.
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Introduction
The ever so famous General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was enforced in the
European Union in May 2018. Even though vast amounts have been written about this
particular regulation, the political aspects have received surprisingly little attention. The
point applies also to scholarly research. It is trivial to find thousands of recent research
papers, position papers, conference presentations, technical reports, commentaries, and
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related outputs from scholarly work across sciences and humanities. However, social and
political scientists have remained mostly silent—to cast aside the commentaries about the
regulation’s perceived impact upon their own craft. This silence is unexpected because
the GDPR is also about power—about the fundamental concept in political science.
Resources to exercise power are the subject of this paper. The paper continues the
recent work of Minkkinen (2019) on approaching privacy policies through privacy
politics and political institutions. The European Union is the polity of interest. While
Minkkinen’s focus was on institutions through which narratives for the future are being
told, the present work takes a much more direct, mundane, and even slightly cynical
standpoint on privacy politics. The research question examined is simple and free from
any evasiveness: how much more power resources do industry representatives have
compared to civil society groups when privacy issues are lobbied in the European Union?
In essence, power resources are about the bases of power rather than about the exercise
of power, and “from basic power resources actors can derive other power resources” in
order to ensure “the capacity to reward or to punish other actors” (Korpi 1985, p. 34).
Here, the capacity to punish or reward refers to the exercising of power through resources
that enable it. The power itself is understood in relational terms; according to a classical
definition, A has power over B when A can influence B to do something that B would
not otherwise do (Dahl 1957). Adjectives follow. “By powerful we mean, of course,
those who are able to realize their will, even if others resist it” (Mills 1956, p. 9).
Stated this way, the concept may seem deceivingly simple, which it is not, of course.
The fundamental problems relate to the relational characteristics, which are difficult to
conceptualize and measure (Dahl 1957, Du¨r 2008). At the expense of depth and realism,
the focus on power resources avoids these major problems. Given many transparency
improvements, measuring lobbying (power) resources in the EU have greatly improved.
Privacy is easy to justify as a highly relevant topic for lobbying research. With few
exceptions such environmental politics, nowhere has lobbying been so prevalent in recent
EU politics. The European lobbying boom started in the late 1980s and early 1990s
during the creation of the Single Market and the gradual transfer of the regulatory power
of the member states to the EU-level (Broscheid and Coen 2003). Lobbying later evolved
into a well-established political practice for policy making in the union, often exercised
between full-time lobbyists and politicians in rooms with more or less closed doors.
These political rooms include also various high-level meetings and related arrangements.
The 2010s privacy politics are among the prime examples on how the closed doors were
at least partially opened; on how the lobbying practices became known also among
the general public. Particularly social media was on flames during the policy making
of the GDPR, and the fire has spread to the current conflagration of privacy politics.
Whether it is non-governmental organizations (Berthe´le´my 2019), public data protection
authorities, or academics, the fierce lobbying by organized business interests has left
everyone dazzled. “Their alarmism at times loses all proportion” (Dix et al. 2013, p. 275).
At the same time, many technology giants have started to exploit a privacy rhetoric to
legitimize their interests (Lindh and Nolin 2017). These political discourses surrounding
privacy lobbying are interesting—yet no previous work has been done to examine the
resources required to upkeep the discourses. The same applies to closed-door lobbying.
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Pluralism
Privacy and data protection are fundamental questions of the 21st century. For many
observers, the GDPR most of all “represents the ongoing battle between unfettered
capitalism and human dignity” (Greengard 2018). The keywords of battle, capitalism,
and dignity might spell out from a random monograph addressing the great narratives
of the 20th century politics. But as it stands, these are also the underlying keywords
in Zuboff’s recent (2019) monumental monograph; a grand theory on the evolution
of capitalism toward surveillance coupled with a rather pessimistic stance on the
possibilities to resist this evolutionary trajectory. While Zuboff’s work certainly deserves
a thorough assessment also in political science, it suffices here to underline that the
work more or less continues the tradition of so-called surveillance studies exercised
particularly in sociology and related disciplines. At the risk of an overstatement, it can
be remarked that this research tradition and its variants are characteristically theoretical
and occasionally even hostile toward empirical research (cf. Bo¨hme 2019, Clarke 2019,
Cohen 2015, Marx 2007). The present work contributes to the attempts to seal this gap
in the existing literature. But when empirical research is a goal, how theoretical framing
might be done with respect to the equally difficult concepts of privacy and power?
A traditional comparative path would lead to consider the origin of the GDPR, the
European Union, in relation to other powers, including the United States in particular.
This comparative path seems sensible at first glance. After all, “the United States versus
the world” has long been the global setup in both privacy politics and the resulting
privacy regulations (cf. Geller 2016). Most large companies at the center of recent privacy
controversies originate from the United States. This has created an enduring schism in
the EU, which, however, does not explain the rationale behind the GDPR. Rather, the
rationale traces to the different underpinnings of many fundamental concepts in the legal
and philosophical traditions characterizing the United States and Europe. Human dignity
is one of these concepts (Neier 2013). Self-determination is another (Bo¨hme 2019,
Rouvroy and Poullet 2009). The long-standing controversies between the United States
and the European Union regarding the historical Safe Harbor Principles and the present
Privacy Shield framework would further justify the comparative path. By continuing
further on the path, also many famous theoretical frameworks unveil themselves.
In particular, the comparative path would sooner or later lead to the so-called varieties-
of-capitalism (VoC) school of thought and its framing between liberal (uncoordinated)
and coordinated market economies (Korpi 2006, Martin and Thelen 2007, Soskice 1999).
As temping as this path is, it contains several severe limitations in the privacy context.
In terms of theory, the VoC approach has always emphasized corporatism as the most
important frame for interest groups and collective action. Corporatism has little to do
with privacy, but the problem runs deeper. Many themes in the theory of corporatism
relate to industrial citizenship—a combination of civil, political, and social rights—
and its collective enforcement through the freedom of contract (Streeck 1997). While
industrial citizenship is part of human rights, privacy belongs to the so-called third wave
of fundamental rights that go beyond the traditional civil, political, and social rights.
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Nor is it possible to collectively bargain over someone’s privacy through contractual
exchange. In terms of empirical research, the VoC approach is problematic due to the
lack of robust comparative data on privacy, whether in terms of regulations or violations.
In terms of practice, it is unclear whether a distinction between uncoordinated and
coordinated approaches to privacy is sharp enough for gauging the present reality. While
it remains to be seen whether the dominant form in the United States—industry self-
regulation—might be still salvaged (Listokin 2017), it should be understood that privacy
has had a legislative grounding also in the United States; the Privacy Act of 1974 is the
prime example in this regard. At the time of writing, it seems also likely that a federal
privacy law will be enacted in the future partially due to the GDPR’s much debated
extraterritorial nature (Isaak and Hanna 2018). Despite of these and other problems,
the VoC approach is not without its merits also in the context of privacy: it forces to
think in terms of interest groups and collective action. Another merit is the approach’s
long history in specifically emphasizing the role and power of employer associations
and organized business interests in general (Korpi 2006, Martin and Swank 2012). As
will be elaborated, business interests are an essential part of privacy politics, although
the political construction of these has fundamentally transformed from the traditional
corporatist setup for coordination. Therefore, in order to think in these VoC terms, the
theory of corporatism must be switched to its classical rival, the theory of pluralism.
Privacy politics are not exercised solely and primarily between political parties.
Instead, Zuboff’s “fight for a human future at the new frontier of power” occurs through a
complex constellation of civil society groups, technology giants (Popiel 2018), industry
associations and business groups, different intermediaries (Zajko 2018), such as Internet
service providers and content delivery networks, standardization bodies and funding
agencies (Mueller and Badiei 2019), and other stakeholders, including also individuals,
whether engineers, scholars, consumers, politicians, bureaucrats, or lobbyists. This
constellation is almost like a textbook definition for pluralism: power is scattered across
multiple distinct agencies, but policy outcomes (privacy regulations) are delivered and
executed through political parties and classical democratic institutions. However, the
scattering of power is not evenly distributed. One agent may hold power, but another
agent may hold more power. A less powerful agent may also have resources to become
more powerful, and yet even a powerful agent may be poor at exercising its power.
These basic characterizations of the pluralist power theory are important for better
understanding the lobbying for or against privacy in the European Union and elsewhere.
Lobbying
The impact of interest groups on policy outcomes is a classical topic in political science.
The scholarly history includes many modern classics, including Dahl’s (1961) seminal
work on pluralism. According to his classical pluralists approach, many interest groups
possess at least some power to exert influence over policy outcomes even in purely
parliamentary political systems. The sources of power vary for influencing others in
political systems. The examples include, but are not limited to, money, legitimacy,
political backing, age, gender, ethnicity, knowledge, expertise, prestige, and charisma.
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stages of the legislative process in the EU. The structure of a political system shapes
the organization of interest groups (Naoi and Krauss 2009). Different EU institutions
are also approached and lobbied differently: the different roles of the Commission, the
Parliament, and the Council require different lobbying strategies (Du¨r 2009, Massaro
2019). The Parliament is the only EU institution that is directly elected and thus
accountable to the EU electorate; the members of the Commission and Council are
appointed. Whether democratic accountability actually occurs in practice is a subject
of a long-standing debate. In addition to the extensive literature on the EU’s general
democratic deficit, it may be that the EU electorate mostly holds national parties and their
leaderships accountable instead of the Members of the European Parliament (Mahoney
2007). National parties remain also important targets for lobbying by interest groups.
Although the influence of national parties on EU policies has decreased, many interest
groups continue to lobby also national parties even on EU matters (Rasmussen 2012).
With regards to the Parliament itself, previous results further indicate that lobbying tends
to follow traditional party lines, ideologies, and power relations (De Bruycker 2016).
To some extent, these points support also the pluralist theory: there continues to be a
parliamentary democratic deficit, but interests are still channeled to the supranational
level despite of weak EU parties and divided institutions (Coultrap 1999). There are five
important further points about this pluralist channeling of political interests in the EU.
First, the channeling tends to reflect party lines and coalitions also in privacy politics,
although it remains unclear how well EU parties and their parliamentarians themselves
articulate their goals for privacy policies. For instance, the legislative drafting of the
GDPR tended to follow conventional party lines rather neatly. According to data from
a civil society group (see Figure 1), the left-wing block (GUE/NGL and S&D) together
with Greens/EFA mostly made amendments that strengthened the legislation’s privacy
and data protection requirements, whereas the remaining parties mostly weakened these.
EFD
ECR
NI
EPP
ALDE
S&D
Greens/EFA
GUE/NGL
Share across a party's amendments (%)
Stronger
Weaker
0 20 40 60 80 100
Figure 1. Share of amendments (n = 2179) made by members of European political parties
that either strengthened or weakened the GDPR’s privacy and data protection requirements
according to OpenDataCity Datenfreunde GmbH and europe-v-facebook.org (2019)
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Second, the amending phase is only one of the stages during which lobbying occurs in
the union. Before amendments are made to a draft introduced by the Commission via a
rapporteur, there is a lengthy open consultation phase. This phase is typically the kernel
for lobbying. During the amending phase lobbyists tend to avoid pressing legislators
who are known to be unfriendly to the policy position advocated (Marshall 2010), which
might explain also the cross-party distribution in Figure 1. During the consultation phase
all bets are off. The length of the phase is also important; there is plenty of time to
channel interests in EU politics. For instance, the GDPR’s preparations trace all the way
back to the Treaty of Lisbon. Open consultations were held between 2009 and 2012, and
Jan Philipp Albrecht (Greens/EFA) proposed the legislation in 2013. The privacy politics
during the consultation did not follow party lines; rather, the dividing line was between
industry and civil society (Minkkinen 2019). Both sides also actively adopted strategies
for coalition building in order to maximize their power to influence the outcome.
Third, privacy politics are marked by a resource imbalance. The lobbying endeavors of
a just few technology giants alone is a “multi-million-dollar enterprise” whose tentacles
have a global reach (Popiel 2018). Money is not the only important resource for power,
however. Further sources include things like the geographic origin of an interest group,
its internal structure and cohesion, and its access and proximity to elites, whether those
in Brussels or those in Capitol (Du¨r 2008, Naoi and Krauss 2009). There are a couple of
particularly important points embedded to the previous listing: elites and geography.
In terms of the former, the close relationship between industry and the Commission in
particular has resulted a distinct institutionalized governance form best characterized as
elite pluralism (Coen 1998). Powerful bedfellows have powerful vested interests. In this
regard, (re)reading Mills (1956, pp. 266–267) is always a worthwhile investment; the lack
of independence between the two weakens checks and balances, and, in the context of the
European Union, the democratic accountability of the supranational political system. In
terms of geography, the vested interests obviously almost always vary across the member
states, but this is not the only important element of geographic variance. It is important
to have direct presence in policy hubs in order to safeguard interests (Ka´rnı´kova´ 2012).
It may be also important to have a patron in some particular member states to influence
the supranational politics through national lobbying. And it may be important to build
distinct European coalitions even though the interests lobbied are international. In fact,
none of these spatial points mean that the interests lobbied would vary much between
European and multinational companies. Previous results indicate that the industry’s voice
is global also in EU lobbying (Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009). The message voiced is
highly similar everywhere: economy is suffering; self-regulation should be the norm;
hoarding of personal data is a legitimate interest as the data is never misused; data
minimization and anonymization are impossible; consumers are rational; opt-out must
be the default; consent is all that is needed; regulations are expensive and inflexible;
sanctions should never be used; and so forth (Dix et al. 2013, Fuchs and Trottier
2017, Minkkinen 2019). Given that many of these issues are also highly technical, it
is necessary to proceed to a different kind of a resource for power—knowledge is power.
Fourth, lobbying is always also about shaping the beliefs, ideas, and cognition of those
lobbied (Du¨r 2008, Ka´rnı´kova´ 2012). This aspect is particularly important in privacy
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has had to rely on impervious consultation with private interests in order to ensure its
own legitimacy and to acquire technical knowledge for the legitimization (Broscheid and
Coen 2003, Coen 1998). Given the complex technical nature of many privacy issues, such
as those related to profiling and fingerprinting, this reliance on interest groups has made it
easy to feed a simple piecemeal narrative to complex socio-technical problems. Nothing
to hide, and so forth. Whether it is (information) security or privacy, a reoccurring
theme in the criticism expressed by the global technical community, including computer
science, is indeed the extremely poor understanding of technology and the impact of the
decisions made without properly understanding the consequences. This general lack of
technical knowledge is also actively exploited by all parties involved in privacy politics:
“LobbyPlag.eu was started as a project to track copy and paste
data protection legislation in the European Parliament. A number of
Parliamentarians have simply copied changes to data protection laws from
Amazon, eBay, the American Chamber of Commerce, but also from
Privacy NGOs – consequently called ‘lobby and paste’.” (OpenDataCity
Datenfreunde GmbH and europe-v-facebook.org 2019)
Last, an often overlooked aspect is that lobbying does not end to an enforcement
of a legislation. Privacy is a good example of incremental politics that span decades,
not years or months. As a good example: immediately after the GDPR was enforced,
a different kind of a lobbying started via consultants, law firms, and other industry
groups who managed to intentionally miscommunicate the regulation to the public
by building a negative narrative around the perceived complexity and implementation
difficulties (Panoptykon Foundation 2019). The ultimate goal of the Commission was to
harmonize data protection regulation in the EU once and for all (Dix et al. 2013), but
this message was quickly lost to the public noise. While some of the agents in this post-
enforcement lobbying had their own profit-seeking motives, others prepared the political
landscape for things to come. In other words, it was well-known already long before the
GDPR’s enforcement that another legislation was in the pipeline: the bootless ePrivacy
legislation from 2002 was about to be updated. Actually, the leaked draft in late 2016
revealed that ePrivacy was originally intended to be introduced together with the GDPR
as a unified package (Burden 2017). At the time of writing, it seems that this indirect
lobbying largely driven by falsehoods and fear mongering has also been successful:
the implementation of ePrivacy has stalled and its future is unclear, but the relentless
lobbying nevertheless continues (Berthe´le´my 2019, Masse´ 2019). For the purposes of
the forthcoming empirical analysis, it is therefore important to emphasize that power
resources are not resources that can be simply allocated for a task and then canceled.
Dress Rehearsal
Data
The dataset is based on the so-called Transparency Register (TR) maintained by the
European Union (2019b) for keeping track of lobbyists. After a number of early 1990s
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initiatives and registers for improving the transparency of lobbying (Greenwood and
Dreger 2013), the TR was launched in 2011 as a joint venture of the Parliament and the
Commission. Although disclosure of information to the TR is voluntary, in practice, it
represents most companies, associations, and other organizations, as well as individuals,
who have an interest to influence policy making in the EU. It is also the largest register of
its kind; presently, it covers over 12 thousand active registrants (European Union 2019a).
Even though a snapshot taken in June 2019 is used, some observations refer also to the
years 2018 and 2017 due to update delays, accounting practicalities, and related issues.
The dataset contains only those who have declared having an interest in privacy and
data protection issues. In practice, the required subsetting was carried with a simple
keyword search from the fields denoting the self-declared goals of a registrant and the
predefined activities covered in the TR. Initially, three keywords were used for the case
insensitive searches: data protection, gdpr, and privacy. However, many registrants have
supplied their voluntary disclosures in their native languages. To account for these cases,
the three keywords were further machine-translated to all of the 24 official languages
in the EU by using Google’s online translation service. Each translated keyword was
subsequently searched from the two fields. While this automated solution is hardly
perfect, it seems sufficient for the simple task of enlarging the amount of observations.
After all, the most important lobbyists supply their voluntary disclosures in English.
Table 1. Categorization
Group Included subcategories (original TR-labels)
Companies and business • Companies & groups
associations (n = 616) • Trade and business associations
Employee associations (n = 70) • Trade unions and professional associations
Law firms and • Law firms
consultants (n = 115) • Self-employed consultants
• Professional consultancies
Non-governmental • Non-governmental organisations,
organizations (n = 166) platforms and networks and similar
Public authorities (n = 29) • Regional structures
• Other sub-national public authorities
• Other public or mixed entities, created by law
whose purpose is to act in the public interest
• Transnational associations and networks of public
regional or other sub-national authorities
Research institutions (n = 44) • Academic institutions
• Think tanks and research institutions
The empirical analysis is based on the sub-categories provided in the TF for classifying
the registrants. After excluding five organizations representing churches and religious
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into the six groups enumerated in Table 1. This regrouping is contextually sensible.
It also ensures a sufficient amount of observations in each group. Furthermore, these
six groups in the assembled privacy-specific dataset reflect the overall distribution in
the TR database (European Union 2019a). The largest group refers to companies and
business associations (CBAs). Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which are taken
as representatives of the European civil society, is the second last group in the dataset.
Methods
Four power resources are considered. The first two are classical (Korpi 1985), the third
one is specific to the European Union, and the fourth relates to implicit coalitions and
networking. The four resources and their operationalization can be elaborated as follows:
1. Money talks also in lobbying. In addition to testifying the general importance of
money for representing interests, previous results have shown that money affects
the probability of having an office in Brussels and the amount of information
supplied to the Commission, among other things (van Hecke et al. 2018). To
measure lobbying budgets, the self-disclosed annual monetary amounts for the
activities covered in the TR are used. Two details are worth further mentioning:
those cases are excluded that use a currency other than euro for reporting the annual
costs, and the maximum values are used in case the costs are reported as a range.
2. Human resources are also important. Lobbying is a labor-intensive occupation.
Thus, the total number of persons involved in the activities covered in the TR are
used. Although the TR provides fields for reporting also the share of working time
allocated to lobbying activities, not all registrants have disclosed this information
consistently. The number of persons involved is therefore a more robust measure.
3. Geography affects lobbying in the EU. It also correlates with financial and
human resources; establishing a permanent office in Brussels is expensive and
requires hiring EU specialists (De Bruycker et al. 2018). Following existing
research (Hollman and Murdoch 2018), the contact details provided are used to
record the registrants’ countries of origin; the records do not refer to contact details
of a potential Brussels office. Thus, Facebook, for instance, is located to Ireland.
4. Networking with others is important in order to derive new power resources
(including funding) through explicit or implicit coalitions stemming from
memberships in further associations. Network-based power does not depend only
on networking with others of similar kind. Therefore: for each registrant in the
privacy-specific subset, an undirected and unweighted network was constructed
by connecting the registrant to all associations, organizations, or other groups to
which the given registrant disclosed belonging to, regardless whether these are
privacy-specific or not. Alas, the TR does not provide a structured format for
the memberships. For this reason, the construction was limited to those specific
associations, organizations, or other groups that were also registered to the TR. For
each registrant, the matching was done with case-sensitive searches for the names
of all other registrants from a free-form membership field of the given registrant.
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The analysis is carried out primarily with descriptive statistics. To compare group
averages, the non-parametric test of Kruskal and Wallis (1952) is used. In addition,
the analysis of variance (ANOVA) method of Scott and Knott (1974) is used for briefly
examining further clustering of the groups according to group means. Despite of some
limitations, the method has been argued to perform well in comparison to other multiple
comparison procedures (Idri et al. 2016). Standard techniques are used also for the
network computations. To compare individual nodes (registrants) and the groups they
belong to, node degrees and so-called node betweenness are used. Both are classical
measures (Freeman 1977). The former gives the number of other registrants to which
a registrant is connected through self-disclosed information about memberships and
affiliations. The latter is roughly defined by the number of shortest paths going through
a node; it is a typical measure for probing connectivity and network hubs. Finally, cross-
group connections are examined by computing the fraction of a group’s connections
connected to other groups scaled by the group’s all connections. Although the labels
and technical details vary slightly (Everett and Borgatti 2005, Sluban et al. 2018), also
this group-based computation belongs to a standard toolbox for applied network analysis.
Limelight
Financial and Human Resources
Financial and human resources are also basic power resources for efficient lobbying.
Thus, Figures 2 and 3 visualize the lobbying budgets and human resources across the
six groups with so-called “beanplots” (Kampstra 2008). Each bean for a group illustrates
the distribution of observations within the group. Vertical lines denote group medians.
As can be seen, the shape of the distributions is rather similar in all beans. Due to the
lengthy tails of the distributions, the similarity is better seen from the inner plots that
visualize the same information with a logarithm transformation. Also the medians are
quite close to each other, although formal evaluation with the Kruskal-Wallis test rejects
the null hypothesis of equal medians for the lobbying budgets (χ2(5) ' 37.8; p < 0.001)
but not for the personnel (χ2(5) ' 7.4; p ' 0.195). This rejection is attributable to the
NGOs and employee associations who both have slightly smaller budgets on average.
Table 2. Clusters between groups (Scott-Knott)
Group Budget Personnel
x log(x+ 1) x log(x+ 1)
Companies and business associations A A A A
Employee associations B B A B
Law firms and consultants B B B B
Non-governmental organizations B B B C
Public authorities C C B C
Research institutions C D B C
Number of clusters 3 4 2 3
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Figure 2. Lobbying budget across groups
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Figure 3. Lobbying personnel across groups
Another way to look at the six groups is to consider the clustering between them.
The Scott-Knott multiple comparison test is suitable for this task. The results from
the test are summarized in Table 2. As the test requires the conventional normality
assumption due to the reliance on ANOVA, the computation was done also with the
same logarithm transformation used for the beanplots. The clusters are relatively clear
for the companies and business associations observed; these form their own cluster in
all cases except lobbying personnel when the logarithm transformation is not applied.
In terms of financial resources, NGOs cluster together with employee associations, law
firms, and consultants. While the results are less clear with respect to human resources,
the main point from the Scott-Knott computations is the distinctiveness of CBAs and
their resources. It is possible to consider these resources also from a different angle.
It is debatable whether mean, median, or any other measure for the central tendency
makes sense in measuring power resources. It is equally sensible to argue for the use
of absolute values: if members of a group activate their power resources for the use
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Table 3. Top-25 Companies and Business Associations According to Lobbying Budget
Company or association Budget Personnel
(1000 e) (persons)
Insurance Europe 6749 35
Google • 6250 15
Microsoft Corporation • 5250 15
Association for Financial Markets in Europe 5000 67
European Banking Federation 4500 22
Facebook Ireland Limited • 3749 20
Deutsche Bank AG 3287 9
Association des Constructeurs Europe´ens d’Automobiles 3000 19
IDIADA Automotive Technology, S.A 3000 15
Gesamtverband der Deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft e.V. 2749 21
Daimler Aktiengesellschaft 2500 16
Novartis International AG 2500 15
Apple Inc. • 2250 7
Huawei Technologies 2190 10
General Electric Company 2000 8
IBM Corporation 2000 9
Vodafone Belgium SA 2000 8
Amazon Europe Core SARL • 2000 10
UK Finance Limited 2000 15
Telefonica, S.A. 1800 6
GlaxoSmithKline 1749 11
Deutsche Telekom 1690 9
Association of British Insurers 1500 4
Qualcomm Inc. 1500 6
Bank of America Merrill Lynch 1500 5
• GAFAM
Table 4. Top-10 Non-Governmental Organizations According to Lobbying Budget
Organization or association Budget Personnel
(1000 e) (persons)
Bureau Europe´n des Unions de Consommateurs 2749 35
First Draft 1250 3
Civil Liberties Union for Europe 980 10
European Organisation for Rare Diseases 900 14
European Patients’ Forum 767 9
European co-operation for Accreditation 723 1
Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung fu¨r die Freiheit 700 6
The Mentor Group 700 8
The NHS Confederation 600 4
Center for Democracy & Technology 500 4
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of power, and a perfect consensus is assumed to exist within the group, the absolute
amounts of financial and human resources would arguably be a much better proxy than
the group’s resources on average. Power resources are important also without being
activated (Korpi 1985). To indirectly influence the Commission, the Parliament, or even
the Council (which, however, is not participating in the TR), it may be sufficient in
some cases to merely demonstrate the possession of vast resources. Given this reasoning,
Figure 4 shows the absolute amounts for three groups. The middle group refers to the so-
called GAFAM (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft), which currently
dominates the global Internet market capitalization (Paul 2018). The differences are
substantial between the CBAs and NGOs. In terms of budgets allocated for lobbying,
furthermore, the GAFAM group is only slightly behind the total combined budget of
all 166 non-governmental organizations observed. By further adding IBM, say, to the
GAFAM(I) group, its budget is already bigger than that of all NGOs in the sample.
NGOs
GAFAM
CBAs
Budget
Millions of euros
0 50 100 150 200 250
Thus, the difference between
 the budgets of CBAs and NGOs
 was roughly about 189 million
 euros in the last fiscal year or so. NGOs
GAFAM
CBAs
Personnel
Persons
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
Approximately in the last
 fiscal year, CBAs had roughly
 about 1723 more lobbying
 personnel than NGOs.
Figure 4. Absolute amount of lobbying resources of three groups
The CBAs with the largest lobbying budgets enumerated in Table 3 are also interesting.
While the GAFAM group is expectedly present, the listing misses some notable business
players in privacy politics, such as the Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB) and its
European branches; IAB is also at the epicenter of many GDPR controversies (Ryan
2019). In fact, IAB’s main European branch in Brussels “only” has a lobbying budget of
about 399 thousand euros to be used for the association’s five mostly full-time lobbyists.
When combined with the branches in Poland and Slovakia, the combined amount is much
more than what the majority of civil society groups and their coalitions have, sans the
few exceptions ranked in Table 4. This ranking is likewise interesting. General rights for
consumers and journalists, as well as human rights, are well-represented, holding the top-
three positions in terms of financial resources. However, NGOs specialized to privacy
and data protection do not appear in the list. Only upon examining a top-50 ranking
do privacy-specific groups, such as European Digital Rights (EDRi) and Access Now
Europe, show in a listing. This observation serves to emphasize an important point: the
NGOs with interests in privacy politics constitute a highly heterogeneous group. Having
a unified stance on privacy matters may be difficult; EDRi’s interests may not necessarily
correlate well with interests of NGOs specialized to healthcare, science, social security,
sports, or even tourism. This lack of cohesion may also weaken coordinated use of the
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scarce resources. In any case: with respect to organized business interests and their vast
power resources for lobbying, the traditionally generous funding provided by the EU for
various different non-governmental organizations (Greenwood and Dreger 2013, Ram
2011) hardly seems sufficient for balancing the resources for power in privacy politics.
Geography
The absolute amounts of financial and human resources for lobbying vary substantially
between organized business and civil society interests. However, there may be a certain
balancing effect because many of the NGOs involved in European privacy politics are
also from Europe. To illustrate this observation, Figure 5 shows the disclosed geographic
origins of all groups in the sample, as well as the locations of CBAs and NGOs.
All groups
1 175
All groups
1 175
CBAs
1 111
CBAs
1 111
NGOs
1 28
NGOs
1 28
Figure 5. Geographic origin of the groups
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The two plots on the first row demonstrate the sample’s general and expected bias
toward Europe. However, the United States ranks fourth (n = 100), right after the United
Kingdom (n = 123), Germany (n = 167), and Belgium (n = 175). Interestingly, the
subsequent plots on the second row foretell that it is particularly companies and business
associations who are registered to the TR but often still located in the United States. From
all CBAs in the sample, about 14% have origins in the United States; only Germany ranks
higher (18%). When the focus is shifted to the NGOs and the two plots on the third row,
it is clear that an analogous effect is much less pronounced; most of the NGOs observed
are European. Germany and Brussels (Belgium) are particularly well-represented in this
regard. Although the link remains implicit with a focus on power resources alone, this
observation is expected: much of the privacy and data protection legislation in the EU has
been modeled according to the national legislation in Germany, and, therefore, it is to be
expected that also the voice of the German civil society is loud in privacy politics. That
said, it should be emphasized that also more fine-grained regional aspects affect lobbying
within the EU (van Hecke et al. 2018). As many legislators specialize in regional
matters, so do lobbyists. Operating at the EU-level requires aggregating heterogeneous
interests (De Bruycker et al. 2018), which may also vary geographically. However, it
remains generally unclear whether privacy politics vary within the EU. In terms of
organized business interests, the variance is likely small, but things may be different with
various national, regional, and local public authorities, research institutions, and even
European NGOs due to their heterogeneous composition. In any case, these geographic
and regional viewpoints to privacy politics provide a good question for further work.
Networks
There exists variation between financial resources, human resources, and geography.
To examine whether the same holds further in terms of memberships and affiliations,
the two node centrality measures are sufficient. The results are shown in Figure 6.
Although not made explicit, it should be recalled that the network constructed contains
also lobbyists who do not have an interest in privacy and data protection. While keeping
this point in mind, the left-hand side plot indicates that many registrants in the six
groups observed have just one affiliation. However, the median is higher for the CBAs.
The same holds for the node betweenness scores shown on the right-hand side plot.
Also the two hypotheses about equal medians are expectedly rejected according to
Kruskal-Wallis tests (χ2(2) ' 20.3, χ2(2) ' 15.2, p < 0.001). Companies and business
associations tend to excel also at networking better than NGOs and other groups.
As with the financial and human resources, both centrality measures exhibit also a very
long tail, indicating the presence of a few particularly well-connected network hubs. To
illustrate these hubs visually, Figure 7 shows a reduced network using the algorithm
of Kamada and Kawai (1989). The reduction refers to the omission of all nodes not
present in the privacy-specific subset analyzed in the previous sections; therefore, the
disconnected nodes shown mostly refer to registrants who only have affiliations with
organizations, associations, or other groups not having declared interests in privacy and
data protection. While again keeping these small technicalities in mind, the presence of
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Table 5. Top-17 Companies and Business Associations According to Network Degree
Organization or association Degree
European Banking Federation 41
Insurance Europe 35
World Federation of Advertisers 29
International Chamber of Commerce 29
Association for Financial Markets in Europe 26
American Chamber of Commerce to the European Union 23
MedTech Europe 21
DIGITALEUROPE 18
Creativity Works! 14
ABB 14
European Advertising Standards Alliance 12
European Publishers Council 12
European Telecommunications Network Operators’ Association 11
Microsoft Corporation • 11
Institute of International Finance 11
Google • 11
Leaseurope 10
• GAFAM
Table 6. Top-17 Non-Governmental Organizations According to Network Degree
Organization or association Degree
European Digital Rights 15
European Patients Forum 13
Bundesverband IT-Sicherheit e.V. (TeleTrusT) 10
International Federation of Reproduction Rights Organisations 10
European Organisation for Research and Treatment of Cancer 7
International Diabetes Federation European Region 7
Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Regulation 6
April 5
Corporate Europe Observatory 4
Global Network Initiative 4
International Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers 4
Bureau Europe´en des Unions de Consommateurs 3
ICON 3
Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights 3
Open Rights Group 2
Arbeitsgemeinschaft fu¨r wirtschaftliche Verwaltung e.V. 2
Privacy International 2
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Figure 6. Network centrality across three groups
CBAs
NGOs
Other groups
Figure 7. Induced network with nodes scaled by their degrees
powerful hubs is indeed highly vivid in the figure. None of these are particularly well-
connected to other powerful hubs. Most of these are CBAs. In fact, there is only one
large NGO hub located in the southeast corner of the visualized network. It maps to
EDRi, which is connected to many other privacy NGOs, including such examples as
Open Rights Group, Access Now Europe, Electronic Frontier Finland – Effi ry, Fundacja
Panoptykon, Chaos Computer Club e.V., Digitalcourage e.V., and Privacy International.
In other words, EDRi in particular faces much better at networking than in terms of
financial resources. The degree-based rankings in Tables 5 and 6 indicate a more general
divergence between those who possess particularly large lobbying budgets and those who
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are particularly well-connected. While the big European associations representing the
banking and financial sectors are represented in both lists, many digital advertisement
associations only appear in the degree-based ranking for CBAs. Another point is that
only Google and Microsoft are represented from the GAFAM group. The explanation
may be simple; the companies in the group are so powerful that networking may not be
a necessity for deriving further resources to exercise power. An analogous explanation
may apply on the NGO-side; the lobbying budgets of the consumer, journalism, and
human rights groups in Table 4 may be sufficient to avoid wasting effort to network with
other NGOs. Furthermore, the American Chamber of Commerce to the European Union
appears in the network ranking for CBAs. Given the earlier comments about the lobbying
practices witnessed with the GDPR’s parliamentary amending, it thus seems that good
connections may be good also for the “lobby and paste” strategy. All this said, the bottom
line is that CBAs are also better at networking—or have more resources to do so—
compared to non-governmental organizations. While the results are partially explained
by the fact that there are also more CBAs in the sample (see Table 1), it seems reasonable
to assume that the principles and practices for networking are more mature and well-
established for companies and business associations. This assumption is generally backed
by the enormous amount of historical evidence presented by the comparative VoC school.
Table 7. Cross-Group Network Connections
Non-privacy CBAs NGOs Other groups
∑
Non-privacy 7950 694 90 150 8884
CBAs 694 330 13 34 1071
NGOs 90 13 44 14 161
Others (in Table 1) 150 34 14 12 210∑
8884 1071 161 210 10326
The final result presented relates to so-called unholy alliances. Previous results indicate
that particularly controversial political questions that attain sweeping media attention
tend to increase the probability of strange lobbying bedfellows (Beyers and De Bruycker
2018). While privacy is a prime example about politically sensitive issues, already the
visualization in Figure 7 hints that beds are seldom shared with antagonists at least in
terms of official cross-group affiliations. Table 7 makes the observation explicit. About
31% of all connections of the CBAs observed trace to other CBAs and only about one
percent to NGOs. The analogous numbers are 27% and 8% for the NGOs observed.
Last but not least, both the CBAs and NGOs observed tend to affiliate heavily with
groups whose interests are not privacy-specific. This observation serves to emphasize that
privacy is only one thing among the heterogeneous interests represented by the interest
groups observed. Data protection enlarges the scope and digital rights enlarge it further,
but these topics are still interlinked to many broader issues in the European Union.
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Curtain Call
This paper examined the question of how much more power resources do industry
representatives have in comparison to civil society representatives in the context of
privacy lobbying in the EU. The answer is clear: there is a great imbalance between
the lobbying resources of the two sides. On average, financial and human resources do
not vary much between the CBAs and NGOs observed, but a substantial difference exists
when absolute amounts are observed. The resources of a few technology giants alone
surpass the combined amount of resources possessed by all NGOs observed. Companies
and business associations seem also better at networking with other organizations,
associations, and groups. On the civil society side, privacy issues are mainly represented
by a few specialized NGOs, which do not network much with other NGOs at least in
terms of official affiliations. Of the basic power resources examined, only geography
seems to favor NGOs: these are mostly European, whereas many CBAs keep their head
offices in the United States even when lobbying privacy issues in the European Union.
All research contains limitations, of course, and this paper is no exception. To begin
with the smaller problems, some data quality issues should be acknowledged. Despite
of the transparency improvements that the TR has brought, the quality of data stored to
the register remains a question mark; the voluntary nature of the register is an obvious
issue, but there are also many smaller technical problems (Greenwood and Dreger 2013).
Examples include unclear updating procedures, maintenance, and the lack of a structured
format for some information. The last point is directly relevant to the presented paper; the
network-based analysis misses many nodes because only TR-specific affiliations were
used. That said, the TR’s problems should not be exaggerated; there is also a strong
incentive for the registrants to keep their records accurate (Hollman and Murdoch 2018).
Turning to the bigger issues, the paper’s essential limitation is also its greatest strength. In
other words, power resources do not tell anything about how power is used. Nor do these
allow to infer about how the exercise of power affects policy outcomes. This classical
problem in political science is particularly pronounced in lobbying research (Du¨r 2008).
But what the power resources approach enables is the relatively objective accounting
of the basic capabilities to exercise power. Merely observing these resources in privacy
politics is also enough to counter Clarke’s (2019) argument that conventional empirical
research would be useless in the 21st century privacy and surveillance settings. But how
to combine power resources with actual politics and the resulting policy outcomes?
For seeking an answer to this question, a good starting point would be to address
the essential limitation of the presented work in conjunction with the basic limitation of
the work of Minkkinen (2019), who draws from open consultations, which are closer
to actual politics, but excludes power resources. There are good examples about the
benefits from combining data from the TR with data on open consultations (Sluban et al.
2018). However, it remains debatable whether even such a combination is sufficient
for analyzing the whole legislative process in the European Union. In general, full-
length tracing requires triangulating quantitative data with qualitative material. To do
so, a good option would be to continue the well-established tradition of using expert
interviews in lobbying research (Beyers and De Bruycker 2018, Massaro 2019). It would
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be also interesting to know how the European privacy NGOs interpret the power resource
imbalance and its hypothetical relation to the use of power for influencing legislators.
Finally, it is necessary to say something about the grand issues put forward by Zuboff
(2019), even if only tentatively. The high-level VoC approach may be useful for tackling
also these issues. As was argued, classical theoretical concepts such as pluralism apply
well also to privacy and related politics. The VoC approach has often characterized
pluralism as being a policy making style that is typical to winner-take-all political
systems (Martin and Swank 2012, p. 137). The global history of privacy, data protection,
and digital rights certainly fits into a winner-take-all scheme; self-regulative laissez faire
has been the norm, and the winner has been the global technology industry and its
organized interests. Yet, the GDPR signals that things are slowly changing. Such changes
make it plausible to use the framing between uncoordinated and coordinated capitalism.
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